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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Safety  studies  are  performed  in the  frame  of  the  conceptual  design  studies  for  the European  Demon-
stration  Fusion  Power  Plant  (DEMO)  to  assess  the  safety  and  environmental  impact  of  design  options.
An  exhaustive  set  of  reference  accident  sequences  are  defined  in order  to  evaluate  plant  response  in  the
most  challenging  events  and  compliance  with  safety  requirements.
The  Functional  Failure  Mode  and  Effect  Analysis  (FFMEA)  has  been  chosen  as  analytical  tool,  as  it is  a
suitable  methodology  to define  possible  accident  initiators  when  insufficient  design  detail  is available  to
allow  for  more  specific  evaluation  at component  level.  The  main  process,  safety  and  protection  functions
related  to the  DEMO  plant  are  defined  through  a functional  breakdown  structure  (FBS).  Then,  an exhaus-
tive set  of  high  level  accident  initiators  is defined  referring  to loss  of functions,  rather  than  to  specific
failures  of systems  and  components,  overcoming  the lack  of  detailed  design  information.  Nonethelessccident sequence reference  to  systems  or main  components  is always  highlighted,  as much  as  possible,  in order  to  point
out  causes  and  safety  consequences.
Through  the  FFMEA  a  complete  list  of  postulated  initiating  events  (PIEs)  is selected  as  the  most  repre-
sentative  events  in  terms  of challenging  conditions  for the plant  safety.
All the  four  blanket  concepts  of  the  European  DEMO  reactor  have  been  analysed.
© 2017  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
The main systems of the European Demonstration Fusion Power
lant (DEMO) have been analysed to qualitatively evaluate the
afety and environmental impact of design options.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: tonio.pinna@enea.it (T. Pinna).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fusengdes.2017.02.026
920-3796/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
/).license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
The Functional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FFMEA) has
been chosen as analytical tool because, being based on a top-
down approach, it is a suitable methodology to define possible
accident initiators and related consequences when no sufficient
design detail is available to allow for more specific evaluation at
component level.under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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. Methodology of analysis
The main process, safety and protection functions related to
he plant are defined at first through the functional breakdown
tructure (FBS). Then, systems and main components of the plant
edicated to perform the above functions are identified in a plant
reakdown structure (PBS) through available design information
nd design intents outlined by the FBS. Each main function is cor-
elated to one or more than one of the components.
Possible failure modes of the functions, related causes, conse-
uences, actions/means set to prevent the occurrence of accident
nitiators and the progressing of accident chains, mitigating pro-
isions and representative postulated initiating events (PIEs) are
dentified with the FFMEA.
Final objective of the FFMEA is to provide a complete list of
otential initiators of accidental events and give suggestions in
rder to improve the overall safety of the plant. From the com-
lete list of initiators, a set of postulated initiating events (PIEs) is
elected as the most representative in terms of challenging condi-
ions for the plant safety. Being each elementary accident initiator
ssociated to one or more than one PIE, analysing deterministically
he accidental plant conditions initiated by the PIEs the compli-
nce of the plant with safety objectives is demonstrated for all the
ossible events judged to be bearers of safety problems.
. Functional breakdown structure
The IEC 61226 [1] defines with the term Function, the “Spe-
ific purpose or objective to be accomplished that can be specified
r described without reference to the physical means of achieving
t”. Accordingly, three different families of functions were identi-
ed for the DEMO plant: process functions, safety functions and
nvestment protection functions.
The main objective of the process functions is to operate the
lant and to cover the experimental program, which is to demon-
trate the feasibility to produce by a fusion reactor, electrical power
o be commercialised.
The main objective of the safety functions is to perform specific
ctions that prevent or mitigate radiological hazards. Therefore,
ctions to prevent or mitigate dose uptake to on-site personnel
nd members of the public and radioactive release to the envi-
onments. Additionally, as the objectives of the safety functions
ave not to be limited to the prevention or mitigation of the radi-
logical hazards, but should include all the actions to prevent the
ther types of hazards for workers, public and environment, such
s chemicals, electric, magnetic, etc. Then, “Safety” describes a
ondition in which protection from nuclear and non-nuclear (con-
entional/occupational) hazards is provided for workers, the public
nd the environment.
The main objective of the investment protection functions is
o perform operations dedicated to safeguard investments such as
achinery and equipment, as well as to minimize operational costs.
Because of the relationships between the three families of func-
ions, to facilitate and avoid duplications during the assessment
ith the FFMEA, the core of the analysis is focused on the process
unctions. The safety and protections functions were considered as
upporting functions to be implemented to correctly accomplish
he process function.
. DEMO systems analysed with FFMEAsFour different concepts are under investigation in Europe for the
EMO plant. They are based on four different concepts of breeding
lanket. Design 124 (2017) 1277–1280
Helium-Cooled Pebble Bed concept (HCPB), with a ceramic
breeder (Li4SiO4 or Li2TiO3), Be pebbles as neutron multiplier and
helium cooling systems to cool-down the first wall (FW) and the
breeder zone (BZ),
Helium-Cooled Lithium Led concept (HCLL), with liquid metal
(LiPb) as breeder and helium cooling systems to cool-down the FW
and BZ.
Water-Cooled Lithium Led concept (WCLL), with liquid metal
(LiPb) as breeder and water cooling systems to cool-down the FW
and BZ.
Dual-Coolant Lithium Led concept (DCLL), with liquid metal
(LiPb) as breeder, partially self-cooled by a secondary loop, and
helium cooling systems to cool-down the FW and part of the BZ
structures.
The main systems of DEMO analysed for the four options of
reactor models are the following:
• Primary heat transfer systems (PHTS) of FW,  BZ, divertor (DIV)
and vacuum vessel (VV).
• Balance of plant, i.e. turbine cycle directly used as heat sink for
the PHTS and, the alternative design option, of an intermediate
heat storage (IHS) system between PHTS and turbine cycle.
• Coolant Purification System.
• Breeding system, i.e. blanket boxes, purge gas circuit for HCPB
and LiPb loops for the WCLL, HCLL and DCLL.
• Tritium Extraction System from breeders.
• Fuel cycle, i.e. matter injection (fuelling systems), vacuum pump-
ing, tritium plant.
• Magnet system.
• Vacuum Vessel system.
• Thermal shields.
• Cryostat systems.
5. Postulated initiating events
PIEs are generally determined looking at the set of elementary
failures that compromise process functions and induce conse-
quences of safety concern, grouping events that induce similar
consequences in the plant and selecting, as representative, the most
severe elementary failure of the group of events. Then, all the identi-
fied PIEs, are analysed again to identify the overall possible induced
accident sequences and to select the minimum set of PIEs that could
be taken as reference to evaluate the most challenging plant condi-
tions. Practically, the selection of the reference PIEs is an iterative
process: from elementary failures an initial set of PIEs are identified
at first, than from this set a reduced set of reference PIEs is selected.
From a safety point of view, the reference PIEs selected are the most
representative accident initiators, in terms of radiological conse-
quences, between a set of elementary events challenging the plant
in similar way and, producing equivalent fault plant conditions.
For each reference PIE, a deterministic analysis will have to ver-
ify the plant capacity to mitigate the consequences and, in every
case, to verify that consequences are below established safety
limits. From the initial large set of PIEs defined by the analyses
performed system by system, a reduced set of 21 PIEs has been
identified as the most representative for the deterministic assess-
ments to be performed for DEMO, both to check the compliance
with safety limits and to give rationales for the selection of the ref-
erence DEMO reactor model. The set of these reference PIEs are
listed in the following Table 1.
Possible accident sequences and needs of deterministic assess-
ments have been identified in detail for each of the PIEs. Between
the 21 events, the HA99 PIE has been recognized as the most severe
from the plant safety point of view because all the primary cool-
ing circuit of all plasma facing components (PFCs) are involved in
T. Pinna et al. / Fusion Engineering and
Table  1
List of reference PIEs identified for the DEMO plant.
PIE Description
FB1 Loss of flow in the primary cooling loop of the breeder
material because compressor or pump seizure
FD1  Loss of flow in the primary cooling loop of the divertor
because pump seizure
FF1 Loss of flow in the primary cooling loop of the FW and BZ
structures because compressor or pump seizure
FM1  Loss of flow in the liquid metal circuit because
electromagnetic pump seizure: the LiPb flow is lost in all
blanket modules supplied by the LiPb circuit
HA99 Loss of heat sink in all FW,  BZ and divertor primary cooling
circuits because loss of condenser vacuum
LFB1 Large loss of coolant from the FW cooling circuit inside the
blanket box due to large weld rupture
LBO1 Out-of-vessel loss of cooling accident (LOCA) from the BZ
primary cooling loop due to large rupture in the coolant
manifold feeder located inside the PHTS building
LBO3 Out-of-vessel LOCA from the breeder primary cooling loop
due to large rupture of tubes in a primary heat exchanger
(or  steam generator)
LFV1 In-vessel LOCA due to a large rupture of the FW structure:
complete rupture of the FW
LDO1 Out-of-vessel LOCA from the divertor primary cooling loop
due to large rupture in the coolant manifold feeder located
inside the PHTS building
LDV1 In-vessel LOCA from the divertor primary cooling loop due
to large rupture in the divertor cassette
LMO1 Out-of-vessel loss of liquid metal from the LiPb circuit due
to  large rupture in the cold leg, downstream the
electromagnetic pump (loss of LiPb feeding to all blanket
modules supplied by the faulted LiPb line)
LMO2 Out-of-vessel loss of liquid metal from the LiPb circuit due
to  a leak in the cold leg, downstream the electromagnetic
pump
LMO3 Out-of-vessel rupture of liquid metal circuit inside the heat
exchanger (HX), i.e. large rupture of tubes
TGG1 Break of tritium gas process line within secondary
enclosure (e.g. glove box): cryogenic fluid and fuel gas
released into pellet injector guard vacuum volume
TGO1 Out-of-vessel release of tritium gas due to guillotine
rupture in the process line of the isotopic separation
system (ISS): tritium release inside the building
TGO3 Release of tritiated effluents to environment due to
misoperation in the tritium process systems: failure to
operate the cryo-distillation columns in ISS
THO1 Guillotine break of the hydrogen gas pipe at the outlet of
the electrolyzer of the water detritiation system (WDS).
Direct tritium release into the WDS  room. Risk of Q2
explosion
TWO1 Rupture of a high activity level holding tank in WDS
VCG1 Loss of cryostat vacuum due to large ingress of gas (He
and/or air)
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TVVA1 Loss of vacuum in VV due to large ingress of air induced by
rupture in a VV penetration
he induced accident sequences. The initiator to consider as refer-
nce event is the loss of condenser vacuum. Such PIE is discussed
n detail in the following section, as an example of the final output
f the work.
Furthermore, it is important to note another general output of
he work on safety analyses presented in this paper: the determinis-
ic simulations of the accident sequences related to all PIEs shall be
erformed both considering ON the power supply and other aux-
liaries of the systems involved in the accidents and, considering
 general long black-out in the supplying of electricity and other
ervices (e.g. 1 h < t < 32 h) to the plant.
. Possible consequences induced by HA99 PIEThe total loss of heat sink in all primary cooling circuits could be
enerated by several disturbance in the balance of plant systems.
he event selected for the PIE is the loss of condenser vacuum for Design 124 (2017) 1277–1280 1279
rupture of the condenser or of lines interfacing the condenser. The
loss of condenser leak-tightness implies the following consequen-
tial events:
1. Ingress of air into steam loop towards low pressure section of
the turbine inducing the loss of condenser vacuum.
2. Turbine trip for protection intervention.
3. Loss of saturated steam into turbine building.
4. Building pressurization.
5. Release into building of tritium permeated through the steam
generators.
6. Direct release of tritium contained in secondary fluid towards
the environment if HVAC is not promptly isolated.
7. Fast over-pressurization of primary and secondary loops if
plasma is not promptly shutdown.
8. Pressure relief in primary loops (it will assure heat removal
from PFCs for a while, giving, even if very short, a period of
time in order to operate the plasma shutdown).
9. Leaks/ruptures in ex-vessel and in-vessel sections of primary
loops can occur (other leaks/ruptures in secondary circuit can
occur too). Both cooling and LiPb loops can be involved.
10. Overheating of the PFC structures.
11. PFC rupture because thermal and/or mechanical stress induced
by the overheating and/or by the plasma disruption (the disrup-
tion could occur both for an activated fast plasma shutdown
or for plasma poisoning induced by the melting of the armour
material in the PFC surfaces).
12. Release of breeder material and coolant inside the VV, i.e. Be
pebbles and helium for the HCPB; LiPb and water coolant for the
WCLL; LiPb and helium for the HCLL and DCLL; water coolant
from the divertor of all models.
13. VV pressurization due to the ingress of coolant. Coolant can be
released from more than one primary circuit, e.g. two FW loops,
one FW and one BZ loop, one FW and one divertor loop.
14. Pressure relief to the expansion volume and/or vacuum vessel
pressure suppression system (EV/VVPSS).
15. In case of double rupture from FW,  BZ and divertor, possible
H2 production due to Be-water reaction for the HCPB model
or LiPb-water reaction for the WCLL, the HCLL and the DCLL
models.
16. Radioactive products and tritium contained inside the VV,
the coolant loop and the LiPb loop are released towards the
EV/VVPSS and towards its surrounding area through contain-
ment leaks.
17. Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high
overpressure inside the vessel.
The following preventing and mitigating features/actions have
been identified:
• Redundant control in turbine cycle:
- Condenser and vacuum line parameters;
- Hot well and degasser parameters;
-  Pressure relief devices;
- Turbine parameters;
• Interlocks between plasma operation and turbine and condenser
parameters.
• Turbine by-pass.
• Pressure relief devices in primary circuits.
• Soft/Fast Plasma shutdown.
• Pressure relief to the EV/VVPSS by rupture disks.
• Atmosphere detritiation systems.
• Emergency cooling (e.g. VV cooling circuit).
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Cryostat venting to reduce the temperature in the VV and its
surrounding structures.
The total loss of the heat sink for the overall PHTS can occur
lso in the case an intermediate heat storage system with molten
alts is used to regulate and stabilize the turbine cycles between
lasma pulses. The rupture of a component of the intermediate
ircuit implies the loss of the entire heat sink, as for the case of
oss of condenser vacuum discussed above. The worst case is the
upture of the out-leg of the salts pump. It causes the leakage of
olten salt in the containment building and the loss of capability
o cool-down all the primary loops.
Deterministic assessment of the accident chains related to the
A99 shall estimate the following phenomenas:
Trend of pressures and temperatures inside the PFC structures
and primary loops after the loss of flow in the steam turbine
circuits or in the IHS (all primary loops involved).
Time to PFC melting (if any) with plasma on.
Thermal and/or mechanical stress induced by the overheating
and/or by the plasma disruption.
Time available before the collapse of the FW and/or blanket box
and/or divertor, if any.
In case the collapse conditions are reached, transient of the
ingress of fluid inside the VV (i.e. cooling and purging helium for
the HCPB, LiPb and cooling water for the WCLL, LiPb and helium
for the HCLL and DCLL, water from divertor of all models):
 Emptying rate of fluids;
 Pressures in the emptying loop;
 Chemical reactions, if any (e.g. LiPb-water for WCLL, HCLL and
DCLL; Beryllium-water for the HCPB).
 VV pressurization.
Pressure relief to the EV/VVPSS.
Amount of radioactive products and tritium released into
EV/VVPSS, into building through containment barriers leaks and
to environment through building leaks and exhausts of the detri-
tiation systems.
Worker over-exposure due to the accident sequence.
Worker over-exposure due to recovering actions.
[ Design 124 (2017) 1277–1280
As the break of PFCs inside the VV could interest most than one
circuit (i.e. one of the accident conditions with the largest inventory
of fluids with high enthalpy released inside the VV) with different
fluids inside (i.e. helium from HCPB, HCLL and DCLL, water from
the WCLL and from divertor of all the models, LiPb from WCLL,
HCLL and DCLL), the accident chain induced by the HA99 shall be
used in “dimensioning” or in “checking correct dimensioning” of
the pressure suppression systems for the VV, either they will be EV
or VVPSS or a combination of the two.
Since in the accident chain related to this PIE, the possibility to
have a release of steam into the turbine building is also identified,
deterministic assessment related to the HA99 shall also estimate:
• Maximum amount of tritium contained in the secondary circuit
because permeation through SGs and HXs and possible tritium
release to turbine building and to environment.
• Turbine building pressurisation due to steam release.
• Need of EV/VVPSS or local cooler for the turbine building in order
to limit maximum over-pressure.
7. Conclusions
The main systems of DEMO for the four options of reactor mod-
els were analysed by FFMEAs. A reduced set of 21 PIEs has been
identified as reference accidents for the deterministic assessments
to be performed in the first phase of the DEMO design activities both
to check the compliance with safety limits and to give rationales for
the selection of the reference DEMO reactor model.
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